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Regulation of Legal Specialization:
Neglect by the Organized Bar
Recent developments in the areas of legal specialization and malpractice
have had a significant impact upon the legal profession. Although there has
long been activity in both areas,' only recently have courts and the organized
bar considered recognizing a separate legal malpractice standard for attorneys
who specialize in a particular area of the law. 2 This note will, first, analyze the
degree to which courts and the organized bar presently recognize specialization
by attorneys, and, second, suggest steps the bar should take before the courts
assume the initiative in establishing specialization standards. The assumption
underlying this note is that it is preferable to formulate these standards through
an organized planning procedure than to allow the courts to create them on a
case by case basis.
I. Present Status of Legal Specialization
The legal profession has debated whether to formally recognize legal
specialization for many years. 3 Despite the intensity of this controversy, defacto
specialization by attorneys is so common that the authors of the leading treatise
on legal malpractice consider the debate "academic.' '4 Recent studies indicate
the extent of defacto attorney specialization. For example, a 1975 survey of Il-
linois attorneys5 showed that only slightly more than one percent of the nearly
two thousand respondents considered themselves general practitioners. Ap-
proximately fifty percent considered themselves general practitioners with one
or more specialty areas, and forty-eight percent considered themselves to be ex-
clusively engaged in specialized practices. 6 Other surveys have yielded similar
results. 7 These surveys show unequivocally that specialization has become a
permanent characteristic of the legal profession, despite its lack of formal
I The first known legal malpractice action occurred in 1435, when a sergeant-at-law was held liable for
malfeasance. See Rondol v. Worsley, I A.C. 191 (1961), cited in R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE S 3 (1977). Specialization, which is undoubtedly as old as the legal profession itself, originated in at-
torneys' refusal to handle certain types of cases. More formal specialization dates from the separation of
functions between barristers and solicitors in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Id.
The barrister/solicitor distinction did not carry over to the United States, and recognizable specialization in
this country did not begin to develop until the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to that time, advocacy,
counseling, and even teaching were all commonly performed by general practitioners. See G. GREENWOOD,
& R. FR.EDRICKSON, SPECIALIZATION IN THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL PROFESSIONS 49-51 (1964).
2 See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
3 This controversy has generated a large amount of legal writing. A bibliography of materials pub-
lished on the topic appears at 34 THE RECORD 441 (1979).
4 MALLEN AND LEVIT, supra note 1, at § 114.
5 64 ILL. B.J. 73 (1975).
6 For purposes of this survey, an attorney was considered to be engaged in a specialized practice if he
devoted at least 25% of his practice time to one area of the law. Id. at 102.
7 A frequently cited California survey indicated that two-thirds of the attorneys in that state considered
themselves defacto specialists. California State Bar Committee on Specialization, Preliminary Report, 44
CAL. ST. B.J. 140 (1969). See also Esau, Specialization in the Legal Profession, 9 MAN. L.J. 255, 260-63 (1979).
The precise extent of defacto specialization in the United States is difficult to determine because "specializa-
tion" has various definitions. V. COUNTRYMEN, T. FINMAN, & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SOCIETY 786 (1975).
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recognition." This is hardly surprising, since in our complex legal system
"lawyers . . .cannot be equally competent for all tasks .... ,9
A. Recognition by the Bar
The history of the American Bar Association (ABA) in dealing with the
specialization issue has been marked by hesitancy and failure. Nevertheless,
the ABA has been moving inexorably, if slowly, toward recognition of some
form of specialization within the legal profession.
The ABA's House of Delegates first recognized the need to regulate at-
torney specialization in 1954. The ABA Board of Governors appointed a sub-
committee to study the problem. It recommended a plain for national specialty
recognition. That plan was strongly opposed, however, and consequently no
action was taken on it.10 In 1961 another ABA special committee drafted a
regulatory plan similar to the 1954 proposal, but it too met strong opposition
from the bar membership. In 1963 the committee was disbanded and its pro-
posal shelved."1
In 1967 the specialization issue was raised again, and the ABA Special
Committee on Specialization was created. Although the Committee's initial
report' 2 recognized the inevitability of legal specialization, 13 it recommended:
"The American Bar Association should not promulgate a national plan to
regulate voluntary specialization at this time. The determination whether to
promulgate such a plan should not be made until pilot or experimental pro-
grams ... have been conducted at the state level ... and the experiences thus
obtained have become available."1 4 This recommendation was accepted by the
ABA House of Delegates at its 1969 mid-year meeting.' 5 The result was a
moratorium on the ABA leadership's efforts to regulate attorney specialization;
and the responsibility for developing regulations was passed to the state bar
associations.
Although the 1969 Specialization Committee's report included general
guidelines for states developing individual specialization plans, those
guidelines impinged very little on the state associations' freedom to shape their
own specialization policies. 16 This decentralized approach had the advantage of
allowing each state to adopt a plan suitable to its individual needs. However, it
had the disadvantage of creating widely divergent state plans. The most signifi-
8 -See also Special Committee on Specialization, Report, 94 A.B.A. REP. 248, 250 (1969): "Even though
many lawyers still at least pay lip service to the concept that a lawyer can be a jack of all legal trades, the
committee finds that in fact modern lawyers cannot be fully proficient and efficient in every field of the law,
and that most lawyers now clearly accept that fact by self-imposed restrictions on their own practice."
9 Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certiication of Advocates Essential to Our
System ofjustice? 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 229 (1973).
10 Derrick, Specialization: Where Do We Go From Here?, 33 TEx. B.J. 255, 256 (1970).
11 Id.
12 Special Committee on Specialization, Report 94 A.B.A. REP. 248 (1969) [hereinafter referred to as
1969 Committee Report].
13 "We believe that our ever-expanding economy will inevitably lead to an ever-increasing pattern of
specialization by practicing lawyers in a limited number of the various fields of law practice." Id. at 250.
14 Id. at 248.
15 1969 Midyear Meeting of the House of Delegates, Proceedings, 94 A.B.A. REP. 115, 129-32 (1969).
16 State experimentation with different types of plans was encouraged by the resolution adopted by the
House of Delegates. Experimentation was deemed appropriate given the lack of experience at regulating
legal specialization. Id. at 130.
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cant result of passing responsibility to the state bar associations, however, was
the acquiescence of the ABA to its loss of future control over the development
of legal specialization. Indeed, it may have permanently forfeited its opportuni-
ty to establish a cohesive program to regulate legal specialization on a national
basis.
The legal profession's fragmented approach to specialization regulation
stands in stark contrast to the scheme of national specialty recognition
developed by the medical profession. While the medical specialization system is
certainly not perfect, it has proven successful for that professional group.
1 7
Although any national specialty certification program established by the ABA
in 1969 might have contained flaws, it would have improved with time. The
important point is that by opting out of the certification process in 1969, the
ABA greatly increased the difficulty of establishing national specialization
criteria at a later time. 18
Shortly after the ABA abdicated the leadership role in the regulation of
legal specialists, the states began to adopt individual plans.1 9 Nine states to
date have implemented specialization plans, 20 and most other states are con-
sidering such plans. 21 The state plans currently in operation share several com-
mon features. 22 First, each is voluntary, and allows both specialists and non-
specialists to practice in any area of the law. 23 Second, each provides for
revocation of an attorney's specialist status under specified conditions. 24 Third,
each contains a provision dealing with the ethical problem of a specialist
17 The American Board of Medical Specialties has supervisory power over the more than twenty in-
dividual specialty boards, and coordinates medical specialty certification in the United States. Joiner,
Specialization in thi Law? The Medical Profession Shows the Way, 39 A.B.A.J. 539 (1959). However, the in-
dividual medical specialty boards have primary responsibility for establishing national specialty certification
standards, determining the competence of candidates, and issuing certificates to qualifying candidates.
A.M.A. REQUIREMENTS FOR CERTIFICATION, DIRECTORY OF APPROVED RESIDENCIES 394 (1974-75). This
system results in nationally standardized requirements for certification in each specialty area. See Note,
Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. REV. 884, 888 (1962).
A major problem with the medical profession's approach is that each specialty board is largely
autonomous. This factionalization should be avoided by the legal profession. 1969 Committee Report, supra
note 12, at 251. Nonetheless, the establishment of national standards by the medical profession remains a
meritorious example for the legal profession.
18 A minority report to the 1969 Committee Report advocated establishing national standards for
specialty certification, stating:
"Unless some strong central agency acts as the overseeing agency, development of specialization
will likely become so inconsistent and factionalized that it will be beyond redemption in the future
and the practice of law, as we know it today, will be lost, as well as will the possibility of ever
developing the full potential of specialization."
Joiner, Minority Report and Separate Statement, 94 A.B.A. REP. 255 (1969).
19 California was the first state to approve a specialization plan. Its Supreme Court approved an ex-
perimental plan in February 1971. Other states soon followed, with New Mexico approving a plan in 1973
and Florida and Texas in 1975. Zehnle, Specialization in the Legal Profession - An Analysis of Current Proposals,
A.B.A. SPECIALIZATION MONOGRAPH No. 2, 20, 22-25 (1975).
20 These states are California, Texas, Arizona, New Jersey, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, South Carolina,
and New Mexico. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 7, 36-42
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 7].
21 Id.
22 Zehnle, supra note 19, at 21-22. Minor differences can be seen even in the common features,
however. INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 7, supra note 20, at 43-58.
23 The plan once considered by Kentucky is unique. Under it, an attorney certified as a specialist would
be unable to practice law in areas other than those chosen as his specialty fields. Esau, Specialization in the
Legal Profession, 9 MAN. L.J. 225, 297 (1979). While such a plan might someday be the norm, it is unlikely to
gain widespread acceptance at present.
One commentator has argued that all trial attorneys should be required to be certified. Note, Legal
Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REV. 434 (1975). No state has yet accepted such a plan, however.
24 The most common condition is failure to meet periodic recertification requirements. INFORMATION
BULLETIN No. 7, supra note 20, at 43-51.
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expanding his representation of clients referred to him by other attorneys.
Despite these common features, the state plans vary widely on the crucial
issue of the basis for specialty designation. California's restrictive approach is
at one extreme, and New Mexico's liberal approach at the other. Florida's plan
represents a middle ground. 25 The other states largely imitated one of these
three approaches.
California requires attorneys desiring specialty status to pass an examina-
tion prior to obtaining official certification by the Board of Legal Specialization
unless granted certification under the state's "grandfather" provision. 26 To in-
sure the attorney's continued competence in his specialty, recertification is re-
quired every five years.
27
Florida does not require an examination. Rather, it allows attorneys to
designate areas of law in which they practice while forbidding their use of the
term "specialist." Florida attorneys need only (1) attest to having a certain
minimal amount of experience in an area of law, and (2) promise to enroll in
continuing legal education (CLE) programs in that area. Continuing designa-
tion of attorneys' areas of practice is contingent upon their completion of 30
hours of CLE in each specialty area during the three-year designation period.2 8
Finally, New Mexico allows attorneys to designate themselves specialists if
they have devoted a minimum of 60 percent of their time to a given area of the
law during the preceding five years. Like Florida, New Mexico requires CLE
as a prerequisite to recertification. Also, attorneys may call themselves
specialists only so long as they continue to meet the substantial involvement re-
quirement.
29
The California, Florida and New Mexico plans also vary in the number of
legal areas in which they permit attorneys to specialize. As might be expected,
states following a rigorous certification process allow fewer areas of specializa-
tion. Thus, California initially allowed only three specialization areas,
although it has since slowly expanded that number. 30 States adopting the self-
designation approach generally allow specialization in a greater number of
fields. For example, New Mexico originally listed 38 areas of specialization,
and that number has expanded rapidly. 3t Florida gave attorneys the right to list
any area of practice, "so long as the designation be of a generally accepted area
of legal practice . . . be phrased in a dignified and professional manner," and
so long as "the prior approval of The Florida Bar [is] obtained." 32 Since the in-
25 A summary of these three approaches appears at 48 FLA. B.J. 168 (1974).
26 "Grandfather" certification is possible under several plans. Although the exact requirements vary,
the California "grandfather" provision is typical. It requires 10 years of law practice and "substantial in-
volvement" in the specialty area of law for 5 years prior to certification.
"Substantial involvement" in an area of the law is also necessary for non-grandfather applicants in
California. "Substantial involvement" consists of: (1) devoting a minimum amount of time to the specialty
field, and (2) meeting specific involvement requirements. (For example, participation in five misdemeanor
jury trials is one prerequisite to becoming a criminal law specialist.) See Esau, supra note 23, at 275-83.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 292.
29 Id. at 288.
30 Id. at 282-83.
31 By 1976, just three years after the plan had become effective, New Mexico recognized 62 specialty
fields. Zehnle, supra note 19, at 24.
32 48 FLA. B.J. 178 (1974).
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ception of the Florida plan, more than 23 areas of practice have been
approved.
33
State specialization plans, then, vary greatly in both their scope and their
substantive rules. 34 As evidence of the sometimes enigmatic nature of state
specialization plans, Florida and New Mexico each allow designation of a
"general practice" specialty. These vast differences attest to the lack of unifor-
mity in attorney specialization caused by the ABA's abdication of its leadership
role. In 1974, after several states had already adopted specialization plans, the
ABA Special Committee on Specialization urged the states which had not yet
adopted plans to forgo implementing pilot programs until those plans already
in effect could be further evaluated. 35 However, the 1977 United States
Supreme Court decision of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,36 upholding attorneys'
constitutional right to advertise, increased the need for regulation of attorney
specialization. Following Bates, the American Bar Association issued a report
urging the states to begin implementing specialization plans. 37 The House of
Delegates adopted guidelines for creation of such programs in 1978, and in
1979 formally approved a model plan of specialization for the states to follow. 38
The ABA's actions in the wake of Bates reflect its recognition of the in-
evitability of legal specialization plans and the urgency of establishing formal
regulation. The ABA has persistently refused, however, to establish a national
board to oversee the orderly development of uniform legal specialization. The
ABA's shifting of this function to the states is shortsighted. It is far more dif-
ficult to achieve a consensus of fifty individual state organizations than to ob-
tain the consent of one large organization. Indeed, it is often difficult to
establish and maintain a consensus within an individual state. The California
state bar's governors recently reversed its decision to make its pilot program
permanent, and both Indiana and New York have recently defeated specializa-
tion proposals. 39 Finally, even if all fifty states approve programs, the programs
will doubtless contain significant discrepancies. These discrepancies will stand
in stark contrast to the uniformity of the medical profession's national
specialization standards.
40
B. Recognition by the Courts
Recent judicial action has brought about a union of legal specialization
33 Esau, supra note 23, at 292.
34 Many other differences besides those noted in the text exist among the state plans already adopted or
under consideration. These differences range from whether peer evaluation of applicants is required to
whether law firms may designate areas of specialization.
35 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON SPECIALIZATION, INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6, 41 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to as INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6].
36 433 U.S. 340 (1977).
37 INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6, supra note 35, at 39-42.
38 Id.
39 See Lawscope, 66 A.B.AJ. 270 (1980). However, Texas recently changed its experimental certifica-
tion program to a permanent one. Id.
40 While the model plan of specialization, see text accompanying note 38 supra, does provide the basis
for national standards, the extent to which it will be followed by the states is uncertain. While all states but
Oregon, Maryland, and West Virginia are currently working to create their own specialty programs, or
have created such programs, only ten have considered proposals based upon the ABA Model Plan. INFOR-
MATION BULLETIN No. 7, supra note 20, at 36-42.
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and legal malpractice. This development emphasizes the need for the orga-
nized bar to clarify its position on legal specialization.
Judicial recognition of legal specialization has focused upon the standard
of care required of specialist attorneys. Most courts state an attorney's stan-
dard of care without reference to whether the attorney is a specialist. 41 While
the specific language used varies among jurisdictions, the normal standard of
care for attorneys may be expressed as "that degree of care, skill, diligence and
knowledge commonly possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and
prudent lawyer in the practice of law in this jurisdiction.' '42 The lack of cases
considering the standard of care required of legal specialists is due partly to the
legal community's failure to recognize specialization and partly to prior restric-
tions on lawyer advertising which reduced public expectations of specialized
competence.
43
The courts' failure to alter the standard of care required of legal specialists
is inconsistent with their treatment of specialists in other professions. Medical
specialists have long been held to a higher standard of care than general practi-
tioners. 44 The courts have reasoned that because a medical specialist is hired
for his higher degree of skill, "it follows that his duty to the patient cannot be
measured by the average skill of general practitioners.' '45 It was only a matter
of time before this kind of holding was juxtaposed with the common judicial
pronouncement that "attorneys are very properly held to the same rule of
liability for want of professional skill and diligence . . . as are physicians,
surgeons, and other persons who hold themselves out to the world as possessing
skill and qualification in their respective trades or professions. . . .,46 This jux-
taposition has made courts begin to hold legal specialists to a higher standard of
care than other attorneys.
The first case suggesting that specialist attorneys would be held to a higher
standard of care was Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand.4 7 In that
41 Judicial non recognition of specialization has at times been extreme. In Olson v. North, 276 Ill. App.
457 (1934), the court failed to consider the possibility of imposing a higher standard for specialists, even
though the attorney charged with malpractice had held himself out as especially competent in defending
criminal cases.
42 Cook, Flanagan & Berst v. Clausing, 73 Wash. 2d 393, 395, 438 P.2d 865, 867 (1968). Most judicial
expressions of the required standard of skill and care refer to the degree of care exercised by an "ordinary"
or "reasonable" attorney.
The reference in Clausing to the reasonable attorney "in this jurisdiction" contemplates a statewide
standard of care. While there is some support for limiting the standard to the practice of attorneys within a
given locality, e.g., Cook v. Iron, 409 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), this limitation is not uniformly ac-
cepted. Houser, Legal Malpractice-An Overview, 55 N.D. L. REv. 185, 197-98 (1979). Given the recent aban-
donment of the locality rule in medical malpractice cases, it seems unlikely that attorneys' liability will con-
tinue to be premised upon the standard of a local geographical base. For comment on the medical locality
rule see D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 95-101 (1973); Comment, Standard of Carefor Medical Specialists,
16 ST. Louis U. L.J. 497 (1972).
43 See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.
44 As early as 1872 American cases had intimated a higher standard of care for medical specialists.
Carpenter v. Blake, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872). Medical specialists are now almost universally held to a higher
standard of care than general practitioners in malpractice actions. HARNEY, supra note 42, at 116; W. PROSS-
ER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
45 Baker v. Hancock, 29 Ind. App. 456, 461, 63 N.E. 323, 325 (1902).
46 Hughes v. Malone, 146 Ga. App. 341, 345, 247 S.E.2d 107, 111 (1978), quotingfrom Citizens' Loan
Fund & Savings Ass'n. v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143, 145, 23 N.E. 1075 (1890). Other recent cases equating the
standard of care of the legal profession with that of the medical profession include George v. Caton, 600
P.2d 822 (N.M. App.), cert. denied, 598 P.2d 215 (1979); Kurtenbach v. Tekippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa
1977).
47 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
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case a malpractice action was brought against defendant attorneys for their
failure to have the summons served on the complaint they filed for the plaintiff.
The attorneys raised the statute of limitations as one of their defenses. In Ned,
the California Supreme Court adopted the "time of discovery" statute of
limitations rule for attorneys, by analogizing to the medical profession. 48 The
court, in a rather expansive statement, went on to announce a malpractice
standard of care applicable to all professions. It stated that "the special obliga-
tion of the professional is... to use the skill, prudence, and diligence common-
ly exercised by practitioners in his profession. If he further specializes within
the profession, he must meet the standards of knowledge and skill of such
specialists. 49 Had this pronouncement not been dictum, it would have made
specialists within the legal profession subject to the same standard as medical
specialists.
The universal professional standard of care suggested in Neel is properly
regarded as mere dictum. It was not until Wright v. Williams5" that a court
specifically held a legal specialist to a higher standard of skill. The plaintiff in
Wright had been referred to the defendant, a maritime lawyer. The defendant
performed a title search on a boat the plaintiff intended to purchase, but failed
to inform the plaintiff that the boat could not be used in "coastwide trade."
The plaintiff purchased the boat and later discovered the use limitation, which
prevented his operating the boat as he had planned. The California Court of
Appeals held that a higher standard of care applied to legal specialists, but
ruled against the plaintiff because he failed to present expert testimony as to
what was necessary to meet a specialist's standard.
51
The language used by the court to define the higher standard of care was
derived from language of prior California decisions setting forth the normal
standard for attorneys. The prior language required attorneys to represent
their clients with "such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary
skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the
tasks which they undertake," compared with attorneys "in the same or a
similar locality under similar circumstances .... ",52 The court retained the
"csimilar circumstances" language, but shifted the focus of the comparison. It
stated that '[o]ne who holds himself out as a legal specialist performs in similar
circumstances to other specialists but not to general practitioners of the law.' 5
Because most state courts express the normal standard of skill and care for at-
torneys in language similar to that used in California, those courts are also in a
48 The time of discovery statute of limitations principle considers only the time after the injured party
knows or should have known of the injury for purposes of determining the timeliness of a complaint. 6 Cal.
3d at 194, 491 P.2d at 433, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
49 Id. at 188, 491 P.2d at 428, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
50 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
51 47 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
52 47 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
53 47 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 199 (emphasis added).
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position to create a higher standard of care for specialists. 54 When appropriate
suits arise, those jurisdictions may well adopt the Wright holding.
In conjunction with finding a higher standard of skill for specialists, the
courts will be likely to create a "duty to consult." This duty would require
general practitioners lacking the expertise to handle certain legal problems to
seek the help of a legal specialist. Such a duty has long been recognized in
medical malpractice jurisprudence, 55 and is at least implied by the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility.5 6 Not until very recently, however, did a court
hold an attorney liable for failure to fulfill such a duty.
5 7
Home v. Peckham58 was the first case to hold that an attorney who
acknowledges that a legal problem is beyond his capabilities must refer his
client to a specialist. The client in Home sought to defer income from certain
property he owned. The attorney recognized that the work was beyond his
capabilities, but did not refer the client to a tax specialist. He instead estab-
lished a trust which later proved ineffective in deferring the client's income and
resulted in large tax assessments against the client. The California Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment against the attorney, holding that attorneys
have a duty to consult specialists when presented with problems beyond their
capabilities. 59
As other jurisdictions develop their law of legal specialists' malpractice,
they will likely accept the Home court's holding. Attorneys who fail to consult
when under a duty to do so will be held to a specialist's standard of care.
60 If
they are found not to have exercised the skill and care of a specialist, they will
be liable for malpractice.
61
A duty to consult does not compel general practitioners to seek the help of
54 See, e.g., Kurtenbach v. Tekippe, 260 N.W.2d 53 (Iowa 1977); George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822
(N.M. App.), cert. denied, 598 P.2d 215 (1979); Dillard Smith Const. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
App. 1976).
In jurisdictions which tie the standard of care to that of ordinary or reasonable attorneys without refer-
ring to similar circumstances, the analogy made in Wright could not be so easily made. However, those
jurisdictions could also recognize a higher standard of care for legal specialists. For example, although New
York's medical malpractice standard of care makes no reference to similar circumstances, see Hirschberg v.
State, 91 Misc. 2d 590, 398 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Ct. Cl. 1977), the New York courts have long subjected medical
specialists to a higher standard than general practitioners. See Carpenter v. Blake, 50 N.Y. 696 (1872).
55 See generally, Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 349 (1971).
56 Disciplinary Rule 6-101 states:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle,
without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
57 Judicial adoption of a duty to consult was anticipated by several years in Comment, Specialization: The
Resulting Standard of Care and Duty to Consult, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 729, 737-38 (1978), and Schnidman &
Salzler, The Legal Malpractice Dilemma: Will New Standards of Care Place Professional Liability Insurance Beyond the
Reach of the Specialist, 45 CIT. L. REV. 541, 547-48 (1976).
58 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
59 Id. at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
60 Id. at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
61 The jury instruction in Home which specified these principles was based upon California's Book of
Approved Jury Instructions, Instruction No. 6.04, and was originally intended for use in medical malprac-
tice cases. It read as follows:
It is the duty of an attorney who is a general practitioner to refer his client to a specialist or
recommend the assistance of a specialist if under the circumstances a reasonably careful and
skillful practitioner would do so.
If he fails to perform that duty and undertakes to perform professional services without the
aid of a specialist, it is his further duty to have the knowledge and skill ordinarily possessed, and
exercise the care and skill ordinarily used by specialists in good standing in the same or similar
locality under the same circumstances.
A failure to perform any such duty is negligence.
[December 1980]
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a specialist in all cases. As the court pointed out in Home, many legal problems
within a field of law in which specialization is recognized (for example, tax) can
nevertheless be handled by general practitioners. 62 However, when the prob-
lem is one for which a reasonable general practitioner would consult a
specialist, the attorney must consult or be held to the higher standard of a
specialist in the area.
There exists, then, widespread judicial recognition of physicians' duty to
consult, 63 limited judicial recognition of attorneys' duty to consult, 64 and im-
plicit recognition of such a duty for attorneys in the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility. 65 These three circumstances indicate that all lawyers
66 will
eventually be held subject to a duty to consult. A fourth circumstance also sup-
ports this conclusion. The standard of care for attorneys is typically based upon
the conduct of an "ordinary" or "reasonable" attorney. 67 If a "reasonable"
attorney would consider it necessary to consult a legal specialist on a particular
question, failure to so consult constitutes a breach of that standard. Therefore,
the duty to consult will increasingly be applied as a facet of the normal standard
of care.
II. The Need for Formal Specialization Standards
While the organized bar moves slowly toward recognizing and defining
legal specialization, the judiciary is beginning to shape specialization for
malpractice purposes without awaiting further word from the bar. Given the
potential effect of this judicial activity on the legal profession, the bar should
reconsider its hesitant acceptance of specialization and act to expedite develop-
ment of a uniform national specialization plan.
A. Issues of the Debate
The debate over whether to approve specialization plans has focused upon
the effect of such plans on attorney competence, costs to the client, and the
legal profession in general.
1. Attorney Competence
The effect of recognized specialization would likely be to enhance at-
torneys' competence to deal with specific client problems. Certification would
ensure that legal specialists possess a minimum level of competence; a continu-
ing legal education requirement for recertification would ensure that specialists
maintain their competence.
It has been argued that most clients would not benefit from this increased
level of competence because of their inability to recognize legal problems re-
62 Id. at 415, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
63 Supra note 55.
64 Home v. Peckham, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979).
65 Supra note 56.
66 This duty would also apply to specialists when they are confronted with a problem outside their are
of specialization.
67 Supra note 42.
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quiring the attention of a specialist. 68 However, the conjunction of a higher
standard of skill for specialists and a general duty to consult would increase the
likelihood that clients whose legal problems require the skills of a specialist
receive such assistance. A nonspecialist faced with such problems would be
unlikely to risk the malpractice suits which could arise from the failure to refer
clients to a specialist.
To understand the relationship between specialization and competent
representation it is necessary to consider the effect of legal advertising on public
perceptions. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona69 affirmed the constitutional right of at-
torneys to advertise the fields of law in which they practice. The ABA amended
its Code of Professional Responsibility following Bates to permit "field advertis-
ing, ' ' 70 but continued to prohibit a lawyer's claiming special expertise where
such expertise was not formally recognized under a state specialization plan.
71
The effectiveness of this arrangement is questionable. As the Tennessee
Supreme Court recently pointed out, field advertising is "calculated to convey
to the lay public the impression that the lawyer is a specialist and, therefore,
possesses particular expertise in the advertised area.' '72 A specialist recognition
plan is therefore necessary to allow the public to distinguish between (1)
specialist attorneys, and (2) attorneys who are not specialists but utilize field
advertising. Failure to implement such a plan not only will deprive the public
of the increased competence resulting from recognition of legal specialists, but
also will result in continued confusion engendered by field advertising. 73 One
unfortunate product of this continued confusion will be a decline in public con-
fidence in the legal profession.
Clients' frequent inability to ascertain the competence of their attorneys in
a given area before retaining them is an acute problem, which state regulation
of specialization cannot fully solve. Specialization programs would help solve
this problem, however, by helping consumers find qualified counsel before
they are injured by attorney incompetence.
74
2. Cost to the Client
The effect of specialization on the cost of legal services is frequently raised
by both proponents and opponents of such plans. 75 Although some studies in-
dicate that specialist attorneys generally realize higher total incomes than
nonspecialists, 76 there is a paucity of statistics showing the actual cost of
specialization to individual clients. Specialists should be able to handle prob-
68 Schnidman & Salzier, supra note 57, at 553; Wright, It's Timefor Specialization in Law Practice: Against,
45 FLA. B.J. 11, 16 (1971).
69 433 U.S. 340 (1977).
70 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule 2-101. "Field advertising" is
advertising the areas of law in which attorneys accept cases.
71 Id.
72 In Re Petition For Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638, 645 (Tenn.
1978). See also, Morrison, Field Advertising-Special Competence or Ordinary Hucksterism? We Need A Specialization
Rule Now!, 66 ILL. B.J. 78 (1977).
73 As recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court, without a specialization plan field advertising is
bound to be deceptive and misleading. 564 S.W.2d at 645.
74 Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REv. 434, 439 (1975).
75 See, e.g., Shields & Wright, It's Time for Specialization in Law Practice, 45 FLA. B.J. 10 (1971).
76 See, e.g., Economics of Legal Services in Illinois, 64 ILL. B.J. 73, 85-86 (1975).
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lems more efficiently because of their mastery of the applicable background
material. However, savings resulting from this increased efficiency might be
offset by specialists' charging a higher hourly rate. The impact of specialization
plans on the actual cost to clients for work done by legal specialists thus re-
mains unclear.
3. The Legal Profession in General
Finally, specialization has been resisted because of its predicted effect on
the legal profession. 77 It has been claimed that lawyers practicing in large law
firms would be the primary beneficiaries of specialization. The validity of this
claim is drawn into question, however, by studies showing that more than fifty
percent of California's certified specialists work in firms with fewer than ten at-
torneys,78 and that only twelve percent of Texas' legal specialists work in firms
with more than twenty-five attorneys. 79 It has also been argued that specializa-
tion would limit the opportunities of young and minority lawyers. The ABA
Standing Committee on Specialization has found, however, that "specializa-
tion plans generally permit [young and minority lawyers] to meet the objective
standards of such plans and thus enable them to compete with the established
large-firm defacto specialists .. ."80
It appears, then, that arguments based on fear of damaging the legal pro-
fession, like other traditional arguments against specialization plans, are not
substantiated in practice. The concerns underlying these arguments do not
justify the resistance to a uniform specialization plan that has slowed its enact-
ment.
B. Judicial Recognition of Specialists: The Bar's Call to Action
The debate over specialization has to date given little consideration to
judicially established specialization standards. As more courts begin to con-
sider specialization in defining legal malpractice, however, the bar must begin
analyzing the need for a specialization plan in light of the role of specialization
in malpractice litigation. The bar's position on specialization will likely be
critical to the courts' assessment of what constitutes legal malpractice.
The principles likely to be applied by courts in determining who will be
held to a specialist's duty can be obtained by analogy from medical malpractice
decisions. Those decisions hold that whether a doctor is a specialist is a ques-
tion of fact, which is generally for the doctor's own determination, 81 in that if
he holds himself out as possessing the superior abilities of a specialist he will be
held to a higher standard of care than is applied to a general practitioner. 82 One
77 See, Wright, supra note 68, at 17;.1969 Committee Report, supra note 12, at 251.
78 Lawscope, 66 A.B.AJ. 270 (1980).
79 Nat'l L.J., Sept. 24, 1979, at 10, col. 1.
80 INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6, supra note 35, at 2. See also Lawscope, supra note 78.
81 Coleman v. Wilson, 85 N.J.L. 203, 88 A. 1059 (1913).
82 See, e.g., McBride v. United States, 462 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1972), in which the court found Hawaii law
to require that an individual hold himself out as a specialist before he would be held to a specialist's standard
of care. The McBride court based its position upon § 299A of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND), which
provides:
Unless he represents that he has greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render
services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge or-
dinarily possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar com-
munities.
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court has carried this to an extreme, holding that even though a doctor is
qualified as a specialist, he will not be held to a higher standard of care unless
he holds himself out and receives patients on the basis of that specialty. 83 Con-
sidering the close similarity between legal and medical malpractice, these
general rules will likely be applied in determining whether an attorney is a
specialist.
Although professionals are not generally held to a specialist's standard of
skill and care unless they hold themselves out as specialists, 84 the courts are not
bound to that rule. In Valentine v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,8 5 the California
Court of Appeals held a doctor to the standard of a specialist even though he
had only completed one-third of the residency program leading to a specialty in
obstetrics and gynecology. The court stated that "the words 'hold himself out'
do not have any independent significance under the law"; instead, "the dif-
ference between the duty owed by a specialist and that owed by a general prac-
titioner lies . . . in the amount of skill required.'"86 The court declared that
since the doctor had performed between 600 and 800 circumcisions he could
properly be expected to have more skill than a general practitioner.
87
The fact that courts might not look to whether a professional has "held
himself out," as evidenced by Valentine, makes it essential that the organized
bar establish objective standards for determining who is to be classified as a
specialist. As one authority has noted, the courts will determine who will be
viewed as specialists on a case-by-case basis, and in making the determination
will consider the specialist recognition or certification that exists by the ABA
and other professional organizations.88 In addition, a firm position by the
organized bar will assist the courts in differentiating between attorneys who
hold themselves out as specialists and those who merely use field advertising.8 9
The courts need not wait for the organized bar to outline the boundaries of
specialization before holding attorneys to specialist standards in malpractice
actions. The courts' willingness to recognize specialization in malpractice
litigation despite bar inaction was indicated by the California Court of Appeals
in Home v. Peckham.90 In Home, the defendant contended that he could not be
held to a duty to consult a specialist because at the time he performed the work
at issue California did not recognize legal specialists. The court rejected this
argument on the ground that defacto tax specialization existed in California at
the time the work was done. 91 In summary, specialization criteria established
by the organized bar would affect the judicial development of legal specializa-
tion in two ways. First, it would give the courts objective standards for deciding
whether an attorney who does not hold himself out as a specialist can fairly be
held to a specialist's standard of skill and care. Second, it would assist the
83 Baker v. Hancock, 64 N.E. 38 (Ind. App. 1902).
84 Supra note 82.
85 194 Cal. App. 2d 282, 15 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1961).
86 194 Cal. App. 2d at 294, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
87 Id.
88 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 1, at § 114.
89 Unless such a distinction is made, an attorney might be deemed to have "held himself out" as a
specialist to the uneducated public by merely utilizing field advertising.
90 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979). See prior discussion in text accompanying notes
58-61 supra.
91 Id. at 414, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
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courts in distinguishing between true specialists and general practitioners using
field advertising.
92
A specialization plan can most meaningfully affect judicial definitions of
what constitutes specialization in legal malpractice litigation only if it incor-
porates objective, verifiable standards. Plans whose standards are not objec-
tively verifiable are of little value because of the difficulty in distinguishing be-
tween attorney specialists and attorneys using field advertising. 93 While objec-
tive standards could be established through either a self-designation or a cer-
tification plan,94 a certification plan adds a degree of formality and supervision
which would insure greater competence than a self-designation plan. 95 The ad-
ditional regulation and supervision by the bar would also increase the plan's
influence with the courts.
96
The ABA should establish a certification program with uniform national
criteria for certification. 97 This would increase the likelihood of rapid national
approval of the program. While most states are exploring the possibility of
specialty plans, the progress is slowed by localized opposition forces. 98
III. Conclusion
There exists today in the legal profession widespread defacto specialization
and a distinct movement toward formal specialization. The courts have begun
to recognize specialization in legal malpractice litigation, but at present such
recognition is limited. Because of this limited recognition, the profession is still
able to set specialization standards which will serve as the framework for fur-
therjudicial activity in the area. Such action by the bar should be implemented
on a national level to reverse the pattern of slow progress and wide disparity in
the implementation of state specialization plans. 99 Establishing a national
specialization plan would bring order to the haphazard recognition of legal
specialization, as well as provide valuable guidance to the courts in defining
-specialist" in legal malpractice litigation.
Lorne Oral Liechty
92 That courts will give deference to the standards set by the bar was alluded to at the text accompany-
ing note 88 supra. It is further evidenced by the opinion in Home, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714
(1979). In that case, the court created a duty to consult. The attorney in that decision was held liable for not
consulting a tax specialist, although specialists were not formally recognized when the work was performed.
The court supported its ruling by the facts that a tax specialty is commonly recognized in those states with
bar approved specialization plans, and was recognized as one of the first areas of legal specialization in
California. 158 Cal. Rptr. at 720.
93 INFORMATION BULLETIN No. 6, supra note 35, at 45.
94 Id. at 44-45.
95 Note, Legal Specialization and Certification, 61 VA. L. REv. 434, 460-64 (1975).
96 The plan must be a credible one to deter the courts from applying a higher standard of skill and care
where the practitioner is not a certified specialist. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
Judicial acceptance of the official certification standards of the bar could also benefit practicing at-
toreys in other whys. For example, attorneys would be able to rely upon specialist designations in fulfilling
their duty to consult. Cf Home, 97 Cal. App. 3d 404, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1979) (defendant attorney thought
he had consulted a tax specialist, but the court determined that he had not).
97 Supra note 42.
98 See, e.g., Lawscope, 66 A.B.A.J. 270 (1980).
99 One hindrance to a national specialization program would be the current operational status of some
state plans. However, since the state plans are few in number and in some cases only experimental, a na-
tional program would not face the obstacle of overturning well-established programs in every state. Indeed,
a national plan could be put into operation concurrently with the state plans. In time, the state bar associa-
tions might voluntarily phase out their specialization plans.
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